Introduction
"…whatever the practice in former times, a modern code of military discipline cannot depend on arbitrary decision-making or the infliction of savage punishments, nor can it depend on inherited habits of deference or gradations of class distinction. Such a code must of course reflect the hierarchical structure of any army and respect the power of command. But an effective code of military discipline will buttress not only the respect owed to their leaders by those who are led but also, and perhaps even more importantly, the respect owed by leaders whom they lead and which all members of a fighting force owe to each other." 1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa makes provision for a defence force that is structured and managed as a disciplined military force.
2 Even prior to the Constitution, to ensure discipline in the military, the South African Military Law had been developed and the military court system has been recognised by the Constitutional Court. 3 This military criminal justice system has been created with a separate system of courts hearing matters pertaining to the usual, as well as other special statutory offences; and with a similar, but separate, investigative procedure, prosecuting authority, and court procedure. 4 This system of criminal justice is based mainly on the Military Discipline Supplementary Measures Act 16 of 1999 (MDSMA) as read with its Rules of Procedure 5 and the Military Discipline Code (MDC) 6 , and is aimed at the maintenance of discipline essential for a fighting force that is necessary in peacetime as it is in wartime. 7 James noted already in 1975:
"The ultimate objectives of the military in time of peace is to prepare for war… The military organisation to meet this objective requires, as no other system, the highest standard of discipline… [which] can be defined as an attitude of respect for authority that is developed by leadership, precept and training. It is a state of mind which leads to a willingness to obey an order no matter how unpleasant the task to be performed. This is not the characteristic of the civilian community. It is the ultimate characteristic of the military organisation. It is the responsibility of those who command and instil discipline in those who they command. In doing so there must be correction and the punishment of individuals…" Although a soldier becomes subject to this system, he does not cease to be a citizen and his rights, as a citizen, remains relevant, albeit in amended form. 9 But, whatever legislation is applicable; it must still be interpreted in light of the supreme law of the country, the Constitution.
10
This article focuses on the independence and impartiality of the military courts as evaluated against section 34 of the Constitution and with reference to foreign jurisprudence. Another issue noted is whether the military system meets the constitutional requirements for accused and detained persons and the right to a fair trial, as set out in section 35 of the Constitution; 11 and further includes the two reported court challenges to the MDSMA: firstly, the challenge to the constitutionality of the separate prosecuting authority; and secondly, the judgment on the post-trial possibilities of review or appeal where a person, who has been found guilty by a military court and sentenced, is dissatisfied with the court's decision.
Military courts -independent and impartial ?
"Although there is obviously a close relationship between independence and impartiality, they are nevertheless separate and distinct values or requirements. Impartiality refers to the state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in respect of the issues and the parties in a particular matter. The word 'impartial' connotes absence of bias, actual or perceived. The word 'independent' reflects or embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial independence. As such, it connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of government that rests on objective conditions or guarantees."
Introduction
The Constitution confirms the principle of a separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. An independent judiciary is crucial to ensure that the law is enforced without fear and favour and it has been found, by the Constitutional Court, to be in itself a constitutional principle and norm which goes beyond, and lies outside, the Bill of Rights. Judicial independence is thus not subject to the section 36-limitation clause in the Constitution. 13 This independence of the judiciary depends on objective conditions that ensure that the exercise of judicial power is not directed or influenced by others. 14 The Canadian case of R v Généreux 15 puts it well: to secure judicial independence, no outsider, be it the government, pressure groups, individuals or even another judge, should interfere in fact or attempt to interfere with the way in which the judge conducts his case and makes his decisions.
The question to be asked is whether the South African Military Court system adheres to the requirements of independence and impartiality. To answer this, it must be determined what makes a court independent. Steytler notes that the principles of judicial independence are defined by (1) security of tenure; 16 (2) security of salary and pension; and (3) administrative (also called institutional) independence. 17 The South African courts have accepted these principles although the application thereof in fora other than the courts has been less strict. 18 This article will use this test, as well as the opinions expressed in foreign jurisprudence, to decide whether the military courts in South Africa can be regarded as independent. terms of appointment (assignment) are either fixed or coupled to a specific deployment, operation or exercise. 27 The Minister, acting upon the recommendation of the Adjutant General, may also remove a person from the function assigned to him for the reason of that assignee's incapacity, incompetence or misconduct, or at his own written request. 28 The CMA may hear appeals and reviews and it is important to note that a finding may include the possibility to substitute any finding of the court of first instance that the record supports. 30 The experience required is as a practising advocate or attorney of the High Court of So uth Africa, or five years' experience in the administration of criminal justice or military justice (MDSMA (s 9(1)(a))). 31 MDSMA (s 9(1)(a)). 32 MDC (s 4) refers to offences endangering the safety of forces and MDC (s 5) to offences by a person in command of troops, vessels or aircraft. 33 MDSMA (s 9(3)). 34 Field rank is defined as any rank not lower than that of major or any equivalent rank (sec 1of MDC). 35 The experience refers to experience as a practising advocate or attorney of the High Court of South Africa or three years experience in the administration of criminal justice or military justice (MDSMA (s 10)). 36 MDSMA (s 10).
Finality of finding and sentence
The finding of a military court is final and subject only to the appeal and review procedures provided for in the legislation to the CMA. 37 Section 97 of the MDC states that a finding of not guilty is not subject to confirmation and is effective when announced in an open court. There is no suggestion in the legislation that confirmation of a sentence is required by another person or institution where a person is found guilty in a military court.
38
The next section of this article deals with several foreign judgments and notes how these courts deal with the issue of independence in the military court system.
Foreign decisions
It is not uncommon for military courts worldwide to use military personnel and the arguments relating to the lack of independence in the military courts are, therefore, not unique. It has been argued 39 that as military personnel operate within a rank structure that is inter-connected, and as the military court is broadly controlled from within this structure, there can be no true independence of a military court from the structure itself. The distinction between the administrative, prosecuting, and judicial authority is not clear enough, as persons within the military system also appoint the members of the court. The only way, in which a military court could be independent from the military as an institution, is to be totally separated from each other.
40 37 See discussion in par 5. 38 There is reference in the MDC to a person awaiting confirmation of his sentence, but it is presumed t hat a subsequent legislative change removed this requirement (s 121(4)). Rule 69(1) provides that every finding, whether a conviction or an acquittal, sentence or order by a military court must, as soon as possible after the announcement thereof, be promulgated either on parade according to the custom of the service or in the manner that the accused's commanding officer may direct, and be published in unit orders. This is however not a confirmation of the sentence and serves a publication purpose only. Another argument is the lack of security of tenure by a presiding officer that also generally fulfils other legal duties within the system. 41 A few foreign cases highlight the problems.
The judgements referred to hereunder relate mainly to section 6 §1 of the European Convention of Human Rights: "In the determination of … any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law…" Human Rights (ECHR) held that the misgivings of the accused about the independence and impartiality of the general court martial were objectively justified. These concerns centred on the various roles played by the so-called convening officer. He was prosecutor, but at the same time the person appointing the members of the court martial. These presiding members were subordinate in rank to him and thus fell within his chain of command. This officer also had the power to dissolve the court martial before or during the trial and any verdict and sentence was not effective until ratified by him. 44 The role of the convening officer was perceived to interfere with the independence of the court-martial system. The court martial had, objectively, the appearance of being unfair and did not accord with the principle that justice must be seen to be done. 45 This case was fundamental to a legislative change in the United Kingdom.
46 41 In Généreux it was argued that as the judge, after serving as a presiding officer, returns to his normal legal duties and that there is no guarantees that his career would not be affected by decisions he made in favour of the accused. The court found that this was not sufficient to be construed as a lack of institutional independence (par 119 The later case of Morris v The United Kingdom in the same court challenged the (amended) British court-martial system. Morris alleged that he was denied a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal on account of various structural defects in the court-martial system. 47 He was a soldier in the British Army and was charged with being absent without leave contrary to the legislation, resulting in his dismissal from the army and nine months detention. As his application for a review was refused, and as his application for leave for appeal denied, he approached the ECHR for relief. On principle, the court noted that the composition and appointment period of a military court are some of the aspects in deciding whether the court is independent or not. Other factors it took into consideration included the existence of statutory and other guarantees against outside pressures and whether the body presents an appearance of independence.
48
Morris was, however, not on the facts successful on any of these points.
Where the ECHR did however find that the independence of the court martial was questionable, was with the fact that a non-judicial authority automatically reviews all convictions and sentences. This authority could overturn any guilty finding, and also make a finding of guilt which could have been reached by the court martial and could substitute any sentence which would have been open to the court martial, not being more serious than the sentence originally passed. The court considered the fact that the review was conducted by a non-judicial authority as contrary to the principle of independence of the court. The court was not convinced by the argument that the existence of the review served the interests of the convicted soldiers or by the essentially fair procedure followed by the authority when conducting the review. 49 In a subsequent House of Lords decision on these facts, it was however noted that a review within the system cannot work otherwise than to the advantage of the accused. The reviewing authority cannot substitute the conviction for a more serious offence, nor can it substitute a sentence for one that is more severe. The House of Lords disagreed with the ECHR and found that it was difficult to 47 Other arguments included that his hearing was not fair due to the actions of the prosecuting authorities and his own defending council. These arguments are not relevant for this discussion. understand how the role of a r eviewing authority can undermine or reduce its independence or impartiality.
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The Morris case referred to two other matters: Engel v The Netherlands 51 where the ECHR found that the Dutch Supreme Military Court, comprising of two civilian judges and four military officers, was an independent and impartial court and noted that "…the Convention will only tolerate such courts as long as sufficient safeguards are in place to guarantee their independence and impartiality." 52 In the Netherlands the appointment of the military members was usually the last in their careers and they were not under the command of any higher authority or under a duty to account for their decisions to the service establishments. 53 In Incal v Turkey 54 the ECHR identified certain other safeguards for independence and impartiality -that the military judges should have the same training as their civilian counterparts and enjoyed the same constitutional safeguards. Aspects that the courts identified that made their independence questionable were the inter-connectiveness of the military system as the presiding servicemen were subject to army discipline and assessment reports; that their appointments were made by administrative authorities, and that their terms of office was only four years and subject to renewability. 62 Both cases related to the independence and impartiality of court-martials: the first of the RAF and the other the Royal Navy. In Cooper the court firstly rejected the argument that service tribunals could not, by definition, try criminal charges against service personnel and be consistent with the requirements of independence and impartiality. 63 Secondly, the court stated that there was no reason to doubt the genuineness of the separation of the prosecuting, convening and adjudicating roles in the court martial process or the independence of the decision-making bodies from the chain of command, rank or other service influence. 64 Thirdly, there were no grounds for questioning the independence of the Air Force judge advocate as he was a civilian, appointed by a civilian. It was noted that the presence of a civilian with such qualifications and such a central role in the court marital proceedings constituted one of the most significant guarantees of the independence of the proceedings. 65 Fourthly, with regard to the ordinary members, the court found their ad hoc appointment and general junior rank did not in itself undermine their independence, as there were safeguards against outside pressures, namely the presence of the other judges and a prohibition on reporting on members' judicial decision-making and the briefing notes distributed to 58 [1992] 1 SCR 259. In this case a new trial was ordered because of the lack of independence of the previous tribunal (par 106). 59 It was argued that a person might not want tenure, as it would cut him off from other promotion opportunities in his career (Généreux par 134 the members. 66 As with the Morris case, the court referred to the anomalous feature of the non-judicial review authority and their rights to interfere with findings made. However, the court found that the role of the reviewing authority did not undermine the independence of the court-martial, as the final decision in the proceedings always would lie with a judicial body. 67 The court concluded that the proceedings were not unfair and did not constitute a violation of Art 6 §1.
In Grieves the court noted the differences between the Navy and the Air Force systems. Of relevance here is that the post of Permanent President did not exist in the Navy and that the President of each court-martial is appointed for each court-martial convened. The court considered inter alia that the absence of a fulltime permanent president, with no hope of promotion and no effective fear of removal and who was not subject to report on his judicial decision-making, deprived the Royal Navy courts-martial of an important contribution to the independence of an otherwise ad hoc tribunal. 68 The second issue related to the fact that unlike in the Air Force, where the Judge Advocate is a civilian working full time for the Judge Advocate General, himself a civilian, the Royal Navy judge advocates, when not sitting in a court martial, carries out regular naval duties and are appointed by a naval officer, the Chief Naval Judge Advocate. Although the court found that this could not necessarily be seen as interference in the independence of the courtmartial, the lack of a civilian in the pivotal role deprived the navy of a significant guarantee of independence. 69 The court found that Mr Grieves's misgivings about the independence and impartiality of his court martial could be considered to be objectively justified, making it unfair and in violation of Art 6 §1.
70

Evaluation
It has been submitted that the composition of the CMA is in accordance with the principles of independence and impartiality. 71 The aim of this section is to re-evaluate this statement in light of the foreign decisions as it is submitted that the independence of the military court judges, with the exception of the CMA, is not be above reproach in light of the test for independence discussed above. 
Security of tenure
The first (and second) issue is security of tenure (as read with the second requirement of security of salary and pension) in that there should not be the possibility of arbitrary removal of a presiding officer or changing of benefits.
72 If the Incal matter is followed (where the court found that a four-year renewable term renders the system non-independent), it could be argued that the South African military judicial system may not be regarded as independent, as the appointments are not permanent but for fixed periods or coupled with specific operations. In consideration of the Campbell & Fell and Spear & Boyd matters (were the possible removal of the presiding officers might point up non-independence), the South African system might also fall short. Lastly, the 'objective guarantee' required in Généreux that the career of a military judge might not be affected by the decision he makes, does also not exist in the South African system and may be interpreted as the military courts not being independent. Having said this, it might be argued that there are guarantees within the South African system to make the system independent: some separation of powers of the various role-players; training; review by a judicial authority to mention a few. In conclusion, it is submitted that it might be expedient to change the compilation of the courts to either include a permanent member (as in R v Spear; R v Boyd and Cooper) or alternatively a civilian (as in Cooper) to appoint members so as to prevent any challenges in this regard.
With regard to temporary appointments, Steytler argues that the temporary appointment of judicial officers (in civilian courts), while essential for the effective functioning of the courts, is often at odds with the carefully crafted rules securing the independence of the judiciary as there is a possibility that the temporary employees would be induced to execute their judicial function to the liking of the appointing authorities. It can, according to him, create an objective perception that independence is lacking. The Constitutional Court in the First Certification judgment however found that an acting appointment of a judge is adequately protected in the Constitution. 73 Can it similarly be argued that a temporary appointment of a military judge therefore is also adequately protected by the Constitution? 72 The focus in this section is on the security of tenure only. 73 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC). See Steytler 1998: 125-132. Steytler (1998: 132) argues that the same can be said about acting appointees in the lower courts.
Institutional/administrative independence
With regard to the third requirement of administrative independence the guidelines by the foreign courts are especially helpful in as far as it relates to the close link between the members of the military courts and the military itself. In Findley it was argued that there should be a clear distinction between the persons administrating the process and the prosecuting authority. In the South African system there seems to be some distinction, although it might be argued that there is not a clear separation between the administrative and managerial aspects on the one side and the judicial powers on the other side -especially by the Adjudant General who makes recommendations regarding the appointment of judges; and the Director: Military Judges who has both administrative and judicial functions. This area may have to be addressed in future. The military prosecuting authority in South Africa can however not dissolve the court as it could in the Findley matter. The court in the Findley case also found that the fact that there was a requirement to ratify the judgment of the court, suggested that the court was not independent. There is no such requirement in the current South African system.
The ECHR judgement of Morris found the review by a non-judicial authority to be questionable. As is discussed later, there is an automatic review by a judicial body in the South African system. 74 However, the fact that the reviewing authority could amend the finding of the court martial was seen, in Morris, as an indication that the court is not independent. On this point the House of Lords disagreed, as did a subsequent ECHR decision in Cooper. 75 The South African law is similar on this point in that a CMA may substitute the finding of the court with any finding which the evidence on record supports beyond a reasonable doubt. It is argued that the position taken in the House of Lords and the Cooper decisions is to be preferred in the light of the compilation of the South African CMA. This position seems to have been endorsed by the South African court in the Mbambo case. military judicial system rests on the use of trained military officers, who are also legal officers to sit on courts martial in judicial roles. If this connection were to be severed (and true independence could only be achieved by such severance), the advantage of independence of the judge might thereby be achieved would be more than offset by the disadvantage of the eventual loss by the judge of the military knowledge and experience which today helps him to meet his responsibilities effectively. Neither the Forces nor the accused would benefit from such a separation."
It is submitted that the South African military justice system in essence provides for an independent judiciary and that the mix of military and judicial expertise is essential for the proper adjudication of these matters. Small changes in the composition of the lower military courts could remove any possible challenge based on lack of independence.
Impartiality
"To assess impartiality … the appropriate frame of reference is the 'state of mind' of the decision-maker".
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When determining the impartiality of the military court, the ECHR in Morris looked at two specific aspects: firstly, that the court must be subjectively free from personal prejudice and bias; and secondly, it must be impartial from an objective viewpoint in that it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt as to its impartiality. 79 The court eventually found that the mere fact that the appointment of the members of the court martial was made within the military system was not reason enough to doubt its impartiality.
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In the South African scenario the rules of natural justice, similar to the above requirements, determine that there should not be actual bias or apparent bias. 81 In in the Communication Operations Department (Comops) that was at the time involved, with the sanction of higher authority (although this was later denied by counsel), in a covert operation designed to vilify and discredit the End Conscription Campaign organisation (ECC), an organisation whose proclaimed objectives were to achieve an end to conscription into the South African Defence Force (SADF) as it then was and to oppose militarisation. 83 The accused, when they learned about the campaign, were 'morally outraged' as it was aimed at a legitimate organisation and the means employed according to them both illegal and immoral. They decided to expose the operation and drafted a document setting out the relevant information and describing the SADF's intelligence system. When the accused were found in possession of the documentation, they were charged with having conspired to disclose SADF documentation and information classified as secret or confidential, to unauthorised persons.
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The accused argued that the court martial could not be impartial as all the members of the court martial consisted of high-ranking SADF officers that would be placed in an intolerable position, as they have to decide an issue, which required them to pronounce upon the legitimacy of a highly sensitive project, which had been initiated and directed by other high-ranking officers. 85 The court noted that the question to ask is whether an independent and objective observer would think that the court martial, initiated and directed by military personnel was truly impartial. The court set the decision aside as there was a high risk of an unfair hearing and found that a reasonable lay observer would gain the impression that there is a real likelihood that the presiding officer was biased. 86 In terms of legislation, the civil courts and military courts enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction with regard to MDC offences and the trial was to be brought before a civilian court.
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It should, however, be borne in mind that the facts in this case were unique and the arguments used in this matter would not be applicable to the average serviceman prosecuted for an offence under military law. to hearings of warders by superior officers, where the court found that where bias flows from form or manner of procedure prescribed by the legislation, applicants cannot complain thereof as such bias is unavoidable within the dictates of the legislation: bias is accordingly not institutional or departmental because it is unavoidable. However, the reasonable suspicion of bias test still needs to be applied and where the test is satisfied, a decision of a presiding officer refusing to recuse himself can and will be set aside.
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Impartiality in the military system is specifically addressed by rule 35 of the MDC 90 that makes provision for the recusal of a military judge and assessors in certain instances: where the presiding judge or the assessor (a) is, or during a trial becomes, related to any accused or the complainant by affinity or consanguinity in the first or second degree; (b) has, or during a trial gains, such knowledge concerning the facts of the case to be heard by the court that his or her decision is likely to be prejudiced thereby; (c) bears any accused, or during a trial develops towards any accused, such animosity as is likely to prejudice his or her decision; or (d) signed as a witness on the accused's election to be heard at a commanding officer's disciplinary hearing. The rules further create an opportunity for the accused to object to any judge or assessor and provides for the procedure to deal with such a request.
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It is submitted that problems relating to a lack of impartiality are adequately catered for in the military legislation. Lastly, it should be noted that impartiality must be assessed on the facts.
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Independent military prosecuting authority -constitutional?
The only South African constitutional challenge to the MDSMA related specifically to the separate prosecuting authority contained within the Act: Minister of Defence v Potsane. 93 The constitutional attack was not against the separate military justice system, nor the hierarchical structure of the military courts, but only directed against one component, namely the prosecuting branch.
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The argument was that section 179 of the Constitution created the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) and vested in them exclusive prosecutorial authority. 95 To have a separate military Director of Prosecutions, it was argued, is unconstitutional and in conflict with this section as well as an unjustified infringement of the equality rights guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution.
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The court disagreed and found, on a historical reading of the section, that although section 179 speaks of a 'single authority' it did not intend to mean 'exclusive' or 'only', but meant to denote a singular 'one'. 97 The court further noted that there were insurmountable problems for the NDPP if it was to control the prosecution within the military context as well, as the two prosecuting authorities serve fundamental different public objectives. Military discipline is not about punishing crime or maintaining and promoting law, order and tranquillity in society, but about having an effective military force capable and ready to protect the territorial integrity of the country and the freedom of its people. 98 The decision to prosecute in a military scenario is more influenced by inter alia policy considerations, interpersonal relationships, and morale efficiency. It would be unfair for a civilian prosecutor to take such a decision -for both the prosecutor and the accused and that is clearly not what section 179 intended.
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The court lastly found that the differentiation between soldiers and civilians is not an infringement of their rights to equality, but the differentiation was rationally connected to the legitimate governmental purpose of establishing and maintaining a viable military justice system. The differentiation was, therefore, not unfair discrimination within the meaning of section 9(1) of the Constitution. In short, the court found the challenged sections to be constitutional. 
Mbambo v Minister of Defence
In the case of Mbambo the court found that the CMA has review powers that are wider than that of the High Court when it sits on appeal. The CMA does not only reconsider cases before it on the record of the proceedings, but has a wider power to allow further evidence. The court found that the offender has a right, in terms of the Constitution, to the meaningful reconsideration of his conviction and his sentence by a higher court than the one that convicted and sentenced him in the first place. This was provided for in the procedures contained in the Act. 118 The conclusion was thus that the MDSMA is constitutional in that it allows for both appeal and review procedures as required by the Constitution.
military court has convicted and sentenced an accused, it must inform him of his or her right to approach the High Court for relief at his or her own cost. However, the court found that there is no express provision for an appeal from a military court to the High Court and that such a right cannot be inferred. The court expressly noted that the military courts are in a better position to ensure military discipline and there is already a right to a meaningful reconsideration within the military system.
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There is no need for soldiers to have the choice of an appeal forum.
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Review to the High Court?
It should be noted from the outset that the court in Mbambo refrained from expressing any view as to whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the court of first instance or the CMA. 124 It is submitted that there should be a possibility that the High Court may be approached with a review application. 125 This submission seems to be supported by the Tsotsi case where the High Court granted bail to a person pending his review application to the High Court of the decision of the military court. 126 The court noted that the High Court exercised a supervisory jurisdiction over the military courts similar to the supervisory power it exercised over the magistrates' courts.
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Conclusion
From the above discussion it is concluded firstly that the military courts can in general be regarded as independent and impartial although, with small changes, any doubt with regard to independence could be eradicated. Secondly, it is submitted that the rights entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution have been adequately included in the military legislation. Thirdly, although it has been held that there is no right to appeal to the High Court from the military courts, review to the High Court has not been, and should not be, excluded.
